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ANSWER TO
RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING

This Court's decision in this case held that the
Russells, in seeking a default judgment, did not submit evidence
as required by Rule 55(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to
show damages sustained under Section 61-l-22(l)(b), U.C.A.

That

section requires the submission of evidence as to the
"consideration paid for the security," "reasonable attorney's
fees" and "the amount of any income received on the security."
The Court's opinion stated that "although it appears that a
hearing was held, it dealt only with the reasonableness of the
attorney's fees to be awarded the plaintiffs."

Based on the

failure to submit evidence on "the consideration paid for the
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security" and the "income received on the security" and the
failure to determine damages based on such evidence, this court
reversed the judgment entered below and remanded the case for
further proceedings.
The Respondents' Petition for Rehearing 1s based upon
their claims that:
1.

The lower court actually heard evidence as to the

amount paid for the note and the income received thereon; and
2.

The amount paid for the note was $55,200.00

because the note recites that amount as the principal which is
to be paid.
The first claim made by respondents is absolutely
contrary to the prior statements of respondents' attorney that
"the question of attorney's fees was the only matter which
required the taking of evidence."

A reading of the Brief of

Respondents, pages 20 through 23, makes it very clear that
respondents produced no evidence as to any matter other than
attorney's fees.

It is stated there that ''respondents went

before a district court judge to obtain their judgment and to
make a proper showing on attorney's fees," "at the hearing it
was necessary to produce evidence as to attorney's fees," "the
question of attorney's fees was the only matter which required
the taking of evidence,'' ''the only amount claimed in the
complaint requiring evidence was attorney's fees," "the record
shows that a hearing was held and evidence was taken as to the
reasonableness of attorney's fees," and "a hearing in fact was
held as to attorney's fees and their exists in the present
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record no evidence that the court falsely stated it had taken
evidence, or that the amount awarded is not reasonable."
Respondents' attorney also states in the Brief of Respondents
that "it is not necessary for a court to take evidence as to the
merits of the case since to do so would require a trial on the
default judgment."

It is quite clear from these statements that

respondents submitted only evidence as to attorney's fees and
did not submit evidence as to any other matter because they
considered it unnecessary.
No reporter was present and no record was made of the
evidence submitted by respondents.

Yet, respondents' attorney

now claims, contrary to all prior statements in this case, that
evidence was presented to the court as to the amount paid for
the note and the income received thereon.

This claim is based

upon the affidavit of David Eccles Hardy (Exh. D to Respondents'
Petition for Rehearing) stating that he, the attorney, produced
for the judge the original promissory note and that he
"testified" that "to the best of my information and belief"
$55,200.00 had been paid by respondents for the note and that
his "understanding" was that no income had been received on the
note.

He also testified that $5,000.00 was reasonable for

attorney's fees.

One might have questioned whether the

attorney's fee was reasonable on a default judgment but, at
least, Mr. Hardy was competent to testify as to attorney's fees.
He was definitely not competent to testify as to the amount paid
for the note and the income received thereon.
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In the first place, as the attorney for the
respondents, he is restricted from testifying in the case.
Code of Professional Responsibility, Cannon 5, E.C. 5-9 and
5-10.

If he had firsthand knowledge of the facts to which he

claims to have testified, he should have resigned from the case
before becoming a witness.

In the second place, it is quite

obvious that he did not have firsthand knowledge of these facts
since he based his testimony on "information and belief" and his
"understanding" and, at best, his testimony was hearsay.

The

intent of Rule 55(b)(2) is not to have the attorney tell the
judge what he thinks or what others have told him, but to have
the plaintiffs come in and be sworn and testify and show
evidence of what they paid and what they received.
Furthermore, if the judge saw and read the promissory
note, it would have been obvious that the so-called "testimony"
of Mr. Hardy was false.

The note provides that the maker

promises to pay $55,200.00 on maturity of the note.

It does not

say that $55,200.00 was paid for the note--only that $55,200.00
is to be paid on maturity.

In the blank in the upper right-hand

corner of the note, where it is customary to set forth the
amount of a note, as was obviously the intent on this particular
note, the figure of $48,000.00 is typed.

Underneath this blank

are the words "Six Months", which one would reasonable interpret
to be the term of the note.

When one applies the stated

interest rate of thirty (30%) percent per annum, or two and
one-half (2.5%) percent per month, to $48,000.00 for six months,
the result is $7,200.00, which, when added to the $48,000.00, is
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$55,200.00.

While one might reasonably question the validity of

such a note on the grounds of vagueness, one can only conclude
that the amount paid for the note was $48,000.00 and the amount
to be repaid in six months, by the maker, was $55,200.00.
other possible meaning does the figure $48,000.00 have?

What
There

is none.
Thus, the "information and belief" and the
"understanding" of Mr. Hardy were false and, therefore, his
testimony was false.

His incompetent, hearsay evidence was

contrary to the only competent "best evidence" before the judge.
The best evidence was the note itself which recites that
$48,000.00 was the amount paid for the note.
Why respondents assert that $55,200.00 was paid for
the note and try to support that by the uncertain, vague and
incompetent affidavit of Mr. Hardy, when it is known to the
parties and their attorneys that only $48,000.00 was paid for
the note, is beyond belief.

The attempt to "create" a record,

where none existed, has emphasized the contradiction between
respondents' present claims and the facts.
Likewise, the parties and their attorneys know that
respondents received $16,800.00 as income on the note and did
not disclose that fact to the lower court.

The injustice of the

procedure followed by the respondents is clear.

They, however,

justify themselves by stating, on page 14 of their Petition for
Rehearing:
The great risk of defaulting i_s that the amount
claimed in the Complaint and the amount found as
damages may be a sum greater than would have been
awarded had the trial court had the benefit of
the defendant's knowledge by way of countervailing
testimony.
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In other words, the plaintiff may take advantage of you
if you don't answer the complaint.
reality.

That risk has now become a

The purpose of Rule 55(b)(2), in requiring testimony

to support the plaintiffs' claims of damages, even on a default
judgment, could not be better highlighted than it is by the
actions of the respondents in this case.
Respondents further state, on page 13 of their
Petition for Rehearing, that:

If defendant Mills had not defaulted . . . , he
may very well have placed before the trial
court evidence that less than $55,200.00 had
been paid by the Russells, or that some income
had been received by the Russells.

Indeed, Mills could have done so and would have done
so but the plaintiff, David Russell, told Mills "that he wasn't
after me but was just after Sterling Martell and Martell Holding
Corp.'' and agreed that Mills should not have to take any action.
(See Affidavit of Mills attached to Appellant's Petition and
Brief for Rehearing).
This court's reversal of the judgment was entirely
appropriate under these circumstances.

However, with the

numerous affidavits which have been filed in this case,
attempting to assert what was said or done on various occasions
in the case, it should be obvious that the only way to fairly
and properly consider all of the facts is to order a full hearing
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on the merits.

Therefore, appellant requests this court to deny

Respondents' Petition for Rehearing and to grant Appellant's
Petition for Rehearing in order to allow this case to go to
trial.

Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

